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Federalism and Civil Rights. BURKE MARSHALL. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1964. Pp. 85. $3.50.
Although now well over a year old, Mr. Marshall's little book, Federalism and Civil Rights,1 is still of topical as well as scholarly interest.
On one level, the book is an analysis of a few of the problems that
arise because the struggle for civil rights in the South has occurred
within a federal system; on another level, the book is a brief for the
Government and, more specifically, for the policies of intervention and
nonintervention adhered to by the Department of Justice in this
struggle.
Mr. Marshall is no longer the Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights, but it is accurate, I think, to report that his views are also
those of the present Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and
of the Attorney General. This statement of the philosophy behind
present-day governmental policy is especially deserving of careful scrutiny because it is, in my opinion, unsound and deleterious in several
important respects.
The large question, as Mr. Marshall sees it, is simply this: do the
results of recent federal attempts to enforce and protect civil rights
entitle us to conclude that there are basic flaws in the structural arrangements of our federal system? On the surface at least, the results
to date, according to Mr. Marshall, suggest that the system is not working well. In the two areas he considers-the right to vote and the administration of justice-the federal government has, he observes, not
succeeded either in making meaningful the command of the fifteenth
amendment or in preventing systematic abuses of the criminal process.
The reasons for this failure are delineated by Mr. Marshall. To
begin with, there is the nature of the federal system itself. It is necessary, he reminds us at the outset, "to be realistic about the limitations
on the powers of the federal government to eliminate racial discrimination by simple law enforcement." 2 For the federal system is such
that the states, rather than the federal government, are vested with
control over the "normally routine decisions affecting the daily lives
of all citizens." 3 In addition, there is a "constitutional reluctance" on
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the part of the federal courts to intrude in the states' exercise and enforcement of these decisions.4 Yet Mr. Marshall hastens to remind us
that these two attributes of federalism are limitations and not necessarily weaknesses at all. His chief villain is, of course (and quite properly), the states-the state and local officials who consistently fail to
do what federal law commands and who equally consistently do what
that law expressly proscribes. Mr. Marshall's general thesis is that federalism is sound, the flaw is in the men. He uses the federal experience
in voting and in the administration of local justice to make this plain
to all.
In that area where the Constitution is plainest and where federal
law is most explicit-the impropriety of any denial of the right to
vote on grounds of race-the results through 1963 were not, in Mr.
Marshall's eyes, encouraging. The attempts by the federal government
to bring about the elimination of racial barriers through injunctive
relief under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 19715 did not yield either
a rich harvest of newly registered Negro voters or even the elimination of racially discriminatory registration practices and procedures.
This was due, he points out, to several factors. First, the techniques
available to registrars intent upon maintaining the disenfranchisement
of the Negro were many. They were often unimaginative, crude, brutal,
and wholly specious (even under state law), but, as Mr. Marshall concedes, they worked. Second, the federal judges were not, for the most
part, enthusiastic about enforcing the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1971.
In what is surely an understatement of the dimensions of the problem,
Mr. Marshall observes that:
[Ilt is inevitable that most district judges want to do as little
as possible to disturb the patterns of life and politics in their
state and community. They are not reformers by profession or
belief. More than one district judge has expressed hostility to
federal efforts to enforce the right to vote, and others have
candidly admitted their personal disagreement with the desegregation decision of the United States Supreme Court.0
Such a description hardly does justice to the ingenuity of those federal
district judges who so effectively and so zealously managed to read section 1971 out of the United States Code and the fifteenth amendment
4 Ibid.
5 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140, as amended, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42
U.S.C. § 1971 (1964). This statute authorizes the Attorney General to seek relief, including
injunctive relief, to prevent acts which intimidate, threaten, or coerce persons not to vote
and to prevent other violations of the voting law.
6 P. 31.
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out of the Constitution. Third, Mr. Marshall explicitly concedes that
the federal policy was one of trying "to make the federal system in the
voting field work by itself through local action, without federal court
compulsion." 7 This is a policy which Mr. Marshall obviously applauds,
and it is one which seems to enjoy no less favor today.
Although progress has been minimal, Mr. Marshall is reluctant to
conclude that there is any "structural reason in federalism" why the
problem cannot be solved. After all, in a few counties vigorous judicial
enforcement eliminated serious racial discrimination. And if this has
been done in some counties, "failures elsewhere can be attributed not
to flaws in the system, but to flaws in courts and men and to lack of
time. And these are defects that can be remedied with enough money,
enough energy, enough lawyers, and enough months and years."s But
the further problem, as Mr. Marshall sees it, is that time may be running out because of the momentum of the civil rights movement. And
it is this which caused him to endorse a relatively modest legislative
proposal that "would temporarily alter and temper the degree of state
control over the registration process in the most difficult counties." 9
The record of the unequal administration of justice and, more
specifically, of the use of the legal system of the state as an instrument
of oppression is, in his judgment, as dismal as that in the area of voting. There were and are, Mr. Marshall observes, innumerable examples
of wholly unjustified arrests of civil rights workers and potential local
voters by local officials. He recites in capsule form a number of the
more typical cases of flagrant misuse of the criminal law. And what,
he asks, can be done about this? Precious little. Why? Because the
federal system is what it is.
The most fundamental, primary notion, of course, is that the
constitutional rights involved are individual and personal, to
be asserted by private citizens as they choose, in court, speaking through their chosen counsel. If the matter is one of unjustified criminal charges, the individual's rights are protected
by the court system and by the right of trial by jury ....

If

P. 6.
8 P. 38.
9 Ibid. The proposal provides for the establishment of federal machinery "whereby in
counties with less than 15 percent of the eligible Negroes . . . registered, the qualifications of Negro applicants turned down by state officials could be tested immediately, on an
individual basis, but under state law, by the federal court, or its officers." P. 39. It is
relatively modest, surely, in comparison to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1965
which summarily strike down many state-imposed qualifications for voting and which
permit the complete removal of the registration process into the hands of federal officials.
79 Stat. 437 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), (b), (d) (1965).
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the federal system of justice is not recognized and followed
by the state courts, then recourse is had from review by the
United States Supreme Court or in the federal courts through
habeas corpus. In this fashion individual rights are protected
on an individual case-by-case basis, as they should be. All that
is involved is a question of time. Even that is not of major
importance as long as reasonable bail is allowed while the
questions are in litigation. 10
Thus, because our federal system is a system in which rights must be
asserted by individuals and in which federal courts will not, except
in very unusual circumstances, enjoin a pending or future state criminal case, there is comparatively little that can or should be done by
the federal government to prevent even systematic misuse of the state
criminal process.
Mr. Marshall suggests only two possible remedies for these abuses,
neither of which is very drastic. First, he proposes that the Department of Justice be given the power to seek injunctions against deprivations of federally protected rights. And second, he suggests, with
considerable misgivings, that removal to the federal courts be permitted in cases involving alleged infringements of constitutional guarantees. Neither of these, however, seems likely to succeed in altering
the plight of the typical militant Negro civil rights worker who is
arrested (and beaten in jail?) for parading without a permit because he
wears a T-shirt that says "freedom now""1 or who is arrested for unlawful assembly because, all alone, he stands with a sign urging people
2
to register to vote.'
As was observed at the outset of this review, Federalism and Civil
Rights is an important book because it so largely reflects the contemporary as well as prior governmental ideology concerning the appropriate reach and kind of federal involvement in the enforcement of
federal law. This ideology holds that the Government's role in the
legal enforcement and protection of civil rights should be a restricted
one. It consists, further, of the commitment to secure voluntary compliance from state and local officials .' And it insists, finally, that the
federal system itself is not at fault-only the persons functioning
within the system are to blame.
10 Pp. 50-51.
11 P. 48.
12 Ibid.
13 That this philosophy still prevails is evident from the fact that federal examiners
have been sent into only a few deep South counties even though the prohibitions of the
1965 Civil Rights Act in respect to literacy tests continue to be violated in many other
counties.
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If taken wholly seriously, this ideology is difficult to understand and
even more difficult to commend. If a system really works so badly, if it
has permitted-as Mr. Marshall so readily agrees that it has-systematic abuses and evasions of the magnitude of those he himself delineates, then it would surely be appropriate to conclude that there are
serious and pervasive flaws in the system itself. The distinction between system and persons is just not a real one. A system is worked
by and for people. If it is a good system, it is good because it fulfills
certain desirable functions, given the nature of the people involved.
It is suspect if, despite its theoretical virtues, people can and do regularly subvert its purposes with impunity.
Similarly, the ideology at times assumes the status of a mythology.
There is surely something unreal and fantasy-like about maintaining
the belief that local white segregationists will act voluntarily to
abandon their vested interests in the maintenance of the system of
white supremacy. And even if there is some plausibility in believing in the possibility of this occurrence, one may still ask where within
the calculus of the ideology is there recognition of the present, immediate, and severe harms done to the Negro citizens of the South? If
Mr. Marshall's analysis is correct, if this is all that the federal system
has to offer, if this is the "realistic" view of federalism, then a
much stronger case than he has made must be made for its virtues.
Otherwise the present injustices, the continuing indignities, and the
more than occasional murders cannot rationally be viewed as a price
clearly worth paying for the nondestruction of the federal system.
But the hard fact, as I see it, is simply that what Mr. Marshall has
described is not the federal system as it is and must be. The limitations he imposes on federalism are in several respects unnecessary.
And it is this that makes his book so troublesome and its philosophy,
because so fully accepted in important circles, so unfortunate. On at
least two occasions Mr. Marshall expresses concern over the "misguided" but incessant pleas of civil rights workers for meaningful federal protection and intervention. The object of his indignation is not,
however, the workers; rather, it is institutions of higher education,
almost all of which have failed to teach people about the limitations
of federalism. Apparently, he notes, the schools and universities attended by civil rights workers "have not taught them much about the
working of the federal system.' 1 4 For, he reports, "there exists an immense ignorance, apparently untouched by the curricula of the best
universities, of the consequences of the federal system."' 5 If Mr. Mar14 P. 49.
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shall's conception of the nature and limitations of the federal system
is correct, then his complaint is probably justified. I suspect, however,
that a solid course in federalism would probably only exacerbate the
demands of civil rights workers. Such a course neither would nor
should diminish the disillusionment of our youth simply because it
would quite properly teach that the federal system permits, if it does
not in fact require, federal activities and federal commitments of a
sort Mr. Marshall does not consider in his book. Let us imagine some
of the things that such a course on federalism might consider.
The course might begin, for example, with the notion that the
United States is a federal system and not a confederacy. Article VI of
the Constitution does proclaim that the Constitution and laws of the
United States shall be the supreme law of the land-even in state
courts and even for state and local officials. But if the supremacy clause
were thought too general an object of study, the course might consider
those federal laws that relate explicitly to civil rights activity. Although
Mr. Marshall does not mention it once, section 242 of title 18 does
provide that:
[W]hoever, under color of any law ... willfully subjects any
inhabitant of any state... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties ... by reason of his color or race,
than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.'
Conceivably exposure to a course in federalism might lead students
to suppose that this penal law (even with its most restrictive interpretation) imposes a serious obligation of enforcement upon those charged
with the duty of enforcing federal laws generally. It would be quite
hard to see why such a course should teach that section 242 really
means the statute is to be enforced only where the likelihood of conviction is great, or where the crime is especially heinous. Yet such is,
apparently, federal policy.
Suppose our course talked some more about the enforcement of
federal penal laws generally. Where is the text that would instruct
the students that an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation-or
perhaps even any person-cannot make an arrest without a warrant
for a misdemeanor committed in his presence? The course could report,
16 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964). See also 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
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though, that FBI and other federal officials have been present innumerable times when section 242 has been violated, and an arrest with17
out a warrant has never been attempted.
To be fair, our course on the federal system might also point out
that some (including Mr. Marshall, no doubt) have argued that there
are sound policy, if not legal, reasons for proceeding with utmost
caution in the enforcement of sections 241 and 242 of title 18. More
specifically, it is often urged that an arrest should not be made or an
indictment sought unless there is a really strong case-unless there is
evidence that even a white southern jury would find it difficult to ignore. But our course should then surely inquire as well into how aggressively the United States has sought to obtain such evidence. Has
the federal government ever, for example, considered disguising FBI
agents as northern white SNCC workers, equipping them with miniature cameras and the like, and sending them into an ongoing racial
demonstration for the purpose of seeing whether those awful, melodramatic tales of police brutality really are true? To put the point
somewhat differently: does the federal government pursue violators
of sections 241 and 242 with one-half or even one-quarter of the zeal
with which it searches out violators of the federal narcotics laws or
labor racketeers? Again, were our students of federalism to ask what
there is about the federal system that makes these laws different from
all other federal criminal laws, I suspect that no very plausible answer
could be forthcoming.
The list of unanswered questions could be lengthened appreciably.
Why has the Government not sought to have the registrars who so
openly disregard injunctions secured under 42 U.S.C. § 1971 held in
contempt of court? Who can say what the deterrent effect upon the
typical recalcitrant registrar would have been had only a few notorious violators been fined or jailed? The only thing we can say is that
not a single one has yet to suffer this fate-despite Mr. Marshall's
acknowledgement that the number of Negroes registered since the
passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1971 is small indeed. Or what about the impeachment of judges who have, in Mr. Marshall's own words, "ex8
pressed hostility to federal efforts to enforce the right to vote"?'
17 To test the consistency of federal practice here, consider the following possible
examination question: "An FBI agent is standing outside a U.S. mint. Suddenly, he sees
three men with stockings over their faces come out of the building. They are armed with
submachine guns and they are carrying bags of money. Would the FBI agent: (a) set up
his tripod camera, carefully photograph the activity, then return to his office and that
evening compose a detailed report of his observations? or (b) attempt to arrest the three
men, using all force reasonably necessary to do so? If your answer is (b), would it violate
any federal law for him to do so?" For powers of FBI agents, see 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1964).
18 P. 31.
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Does it not cease to be "good behavior" within the meaning of article
III of the Constitution when this hostility is expressed in open court
and overtly acted upon to the detriment of federal laws and the rights
protected by those laws? How should the schools have taught the impatient, disillusioned civil rights workers to answer this one?
There may be, although I do not think there are, good and satisfying answers to these and other questions. The questions are almost
surely, however, unanswerable from an inspection and analysis of the
structure of the federal system. One can, of course, answer them by
reading into the federal system all of the limitations and restrictions
that Mr. Marshall apparently finds there. But one should be very clear
that what is then being discussed is not the federal system per se, but
rather the federal system with a complicated, restrictive, and by no
means self-justifiable gloss imposed by conscious choice, and not by
structural or textual necessity.
Another attempted answer would point to the political dimensions
of the problem: since a southern Senator controls certain key committees, the White House deems it inexpedient to push too hard for
registration in his state; since the FBI is, as a practical matter, immune from direction by even the Attorney General, FBI agents cannot be forced to make arrests; since if a local white southern official
is prosecuted, the only result will be the solidification of his local
power base, prosecution is politically unwise. I do not mean to suggest that factors such as these are necessarily crass or unworthy of
consideration just because they are labeled "political." Indeed, they
may well be decisive. But they are not, I suspect, the kinds of things
that Mr. Marshall expects to have taught in that course on federalism.
My complaint with Mr. Marshall's book is, of course, in part disagreement with the policies of limited action under which the federal
government has proceeded in the area of civil rights. More relevant
to an assessment of the book's merit, however, is its failure even to
hint that these constraints might be the result, not of our federal system, but rather of a series of conscious decisions to reinterpret, redefine, and reconstruct the limits of justifiable federal action. The hard
question that Mr. Marshall's book does not answer satisfactorily is
how, in the light of the dismal record of enforcement to date and the
injuries all too long endured and still suffered daily, the continued
imposition of these constraints on federal action can still seem defensible.
RICHARD A.
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, Tuskegee Institute.
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